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THE HUMAN GENOME: A PATENTING DILEMMA
INTRODUCTION
In June, 1991 the National Institutes of Health (NIH)' filed a patent for 351
human gene fragments sequenced in the laboratory of NIH scientist Craig
Venter. 2 A continuation-in-part application,3 covering an additional 2,000 frag-
ments and their associated genes, was filed by NIH shortly thereafter. 4 At the
same time, Dr. Venter announced plans to sequence5 every active gene in the
human brain.6
The issue as to whether patent rights should be granted for this discovery is
exceedingly complicated. This is because the NIH researchers do not know the
biological functions of the genes they have claimed. 7 Nonetheless, NIH's broad
patent claims to the partial gene fragments and to the complete genes encompass-
ing each fragment could conceivably give it control over any medical product
developed using the patented genes. 8 Thus, this single patentee could have legal
control over a large area'of biomedical research and development. As a result,
NIH's decision to file for these patents has created a storm of controversy among
scientists and members of the biotechnology industry.9 In addition, the filing has
engendered a debate among patent lawyers who have expressed divergent views
1 NIH is the predominant government agency involved in biomedical research.
2 INDUSTRIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION, IBA POSITION PAPER: RECOMMENDED FEDERAL POLICY
CONCERNING HUMAN GENETIC SEQUENCES DISCOVERED BY FEDERAL RESEARCHERS, CONTRACTORS
AND GRANTEES, 2 (1992). [hereinafter POSITION PAPER]
3 A continuation-in-part application may give the later claimed inventions the benefit of the earlier filing date.
35 U.S.C. §120 (1988).
4 Paul H. Ginsberg, 77e NIH Patent Application and Technology Transfer Issues. 7 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 181992).
For a complete description of the relationship between DNA sequences and genes, see JAMES D. WATSON
ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE, Ch. 1 (4th ed. 1987).
In brief, the genetic information in each cell resides primarily in the DNA that is a component of
chromosomes. This genetic information is encoded in the sequence of the four different nucleotide bases that
are linearly and irregularly distributed along each chain of a DNA molecule. The sequence of bases along a
given length of DNA serves as a template to make messenger RNA (mRNA), another nucleic acid which is
found primarily in the cytoplasm of the cell. In turn, the mRNA transcripts serve as templates for protein
synthesis.
Each gene consists of a number of codons. A codon is a sequence of three nucleotide bases that either
specifies a particular amino acid in the protein molecule encoded by that particular gene or acts as a signal to
terminate the synthesis of the encoded protein. Thus, one can predict the order of amino acids in a given protein
if one knows the sequence of bases in the DNA that codes for that protein. Conversely, one can predict the
sequence of bases in a given gene if one knows the order of amino acids in the protein encoded by that gene.
6 Leslie Roberts, Genome Patent Fight Erupts, 254 SCIENCE 184 (1992). Estimates incidate that Dr. Vetner
can sequence 1,000 to 2,000 fragments each month. See POSITION PAPER, supra note 2, at 3.
Of the 50,000 to 100,000 active genes found in the human genome, approximately 30,000 are expressed in
brain. J. G. Sutcliffe, II ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 157 (1988).
7 Warren E. Leary, Health Counsel Opposes New Gene Patents, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 8, 1992, at B26.
Conceivably, one of the genes NIH has claimed could control the onset of Alzheimers disease.
Opinion Editorial, Double Helix Battles. WASH. POST, May 1, 1992, at A26.
9 See POSITION PAPER, supra note 2.
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on whether and when private intellectual property rights in such knowledge
should be granted.' 0 Further, several federal agencies have formed a group to
determine how the U.S. patent laws apply to this research."1
Although the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) rejected NIH's initial ap-
plication, Dr. Bernadine Healy, the director of NIH, is optimistic that many of the
PTO's objections can be overcome.' 2 Indeed, many who object to NIH obtaining
proprietary rights for this information hope that the agency continues to pursue
the patent, t3 thus allowing the judiciary an opportunity to clarify the issues raised
by this application. 14
This Comment will address the conflict between the U.S. patent laws and
biotechnology by focusing on the NIH patent application. The first part of this
Comment discusses the objectives and statutory requirements of the patent sys-
tem, which the NIH application purportedly did not meet.'5 Next, this Comment
focuses on the debate between NIH and its detractors. It explains NIH's reasons
for its actions' 6 and discusses the criticisms leveled at the agency. 17 Finally, this
Comment presents solutions to the problems that have been uncovered by this
debate regarding the patentability of genes.' 8
1U See Opinion Editorial, supra note 8, at A26.
1 Robin Elizabeth Margolis, Regulator" Update. 9 HEALTHSPAN 22,23 (1992).
12 See Leary, supra note 7, at B26. Dr. Healy's spokeswoman said that NIH had sent the PTO opinion to
outside counsel, who advised her that an initial rejection is commonplace and that the rejection could be
overcome.
If an applicant chooses not to answer the patent examiner's objection within six months, the PTO considers
the application abandoned. 35 U.S.C. §133 (1988). If the applicant responds and the PTO rejects it a second
time, the applicant may then appeal the decision to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. 35 U.S.C.
§ 134 (1988). If the applicant finds the decision of the Board of Appeals unsatisfactory, it may then appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 35 U.S.C. §141 (1988). The Federal Circuit was created
by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Publ. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Those who argued for establishing a specific court to handle patent cases felt a
need for increased stability and predictability of patent doctrine. Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and
Patents. 76 CAL. L. REV. 805, 821 (1988). Although the Supreme Court has the final word on patent law, it
has heard very few patent cases since the formation of the Federal Circuit. See. id. at 820 n. 58. However, the
Supreme Court still could decide to review the issues raised by the NIH case.
13 The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has approved NIHrs request to appeal the preliminary
ruling. Christopher Anderson, NIH to Appeal Patent Decision, 259 SCIENCE 301, 302 (1993).
14 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genes. Patents, and Product Development. 257 SCIENCE 903, 904 (1992);
Thomas D. Kiley, Patents on Random Complementary DNA Fragments?, 257 SCIENCE 915 (1992).
15 See infra text accompanying notes 19-162. The NIH patent was rejected under 35 U.S.C. §§101, 102(a),
103, 112 (1988). What the Patent Office Report Says, 258 SCIENCE 210, 210 (1992) [hereinafter Office Report].
16 See infra text accompanying notes 164-212.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 213-257.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 258-313.
[Vol. 26: 3-4
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THE PATENT SYSTEM: OBJECTIVES
AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
Purpose
Article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution grants
Congress the power "to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts" by
offering inventors a limited monopoly on their inventions.' 9 Under this limited
monopoly, an inventor can exclude others from making, using or selling the in-
vention for a set period of time.20 Several mechanisms explain how patents pro-
mote the progress of science. First, the promise of a patent acts as an incentive to
invent.21 Without this promise, an inventor might not be willing to risk the
"enormous cost in terms of time, research and development." 22 Second, patents
promote disclosure of inventions to the public because patent laws require a full
and clear description of the invention23 so that others can use and make it after
the patent has expired.24 Without patent protection, inventors might otherwise be
tempted to keep the details of their invention secret to avoid competition. 25 When
the information contained in the patent is added to the "general store of knowl-
edge," it presumably "stimulate[s] ideas and the eventual development of further
signficant advances in the art."26 In addition, the patent system fosters capital in-
vestment in research.27 Ultimately, the hope is that "the productive effort thereby
fostered will have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new
products and processes of manufacture into the economy and the emanations by
way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens. 28
Statutory Requirement §101: Patentable Subject Matter
Congress first enacted legislation to implement the patent system in 179029
and most recently amended the full set of statutory requirements for obtaining a
patent in 1952.30 Section 101 of the Patent Act defines patentable subject matter
as "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
19 U.S. CONST. art 1, §8, cl. 8.
20 35 U.S.C. §271 (a) (1988). Currently, the period for a utility patent is seventeen years. 35 U.S.C. §154
V19 88).
For a detailed explanation of the incentive theory and disclosure theory, see Michael S. Greenfield,
Recombinant DNA Technology: A Science Struggling with the Patent Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1058-59
1992).
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,480 (1974).
23 35 U.S.C. §112 (1988).
24 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480.
25 See, e.g., Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Glove Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471,484 (1944).
26 Kewanee, 416U.S. at 481.
27 Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting Innovation to the Procrustean Bed, 17 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 1, 24 (1991).
28 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1979) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
4 0, 480 (1974)).
2 Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
30 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§1-376 (1988)).
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or any new and useful improvement thereof.' 31 In contrast to most foreign patent
statutes, 32 § 101 does not expressly exclude particular categories of subject matter
from patentability. Exclusion is relegated to the judiciary.
Because human genes reside in every cell of every human being, theoreti-
cally, one might argue that the DNA sequences which encode human genes33 are
not new compositions of matter and therefore are non-patentable under §101.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,
held that patents could not be issued for "the discovery of the phenomena of na-
ture."34 In Funk Brothers, the plaintiff held a patent on a mixed culture of differ-
ent strains of bacteria which could be used to promote fixation of nitrogen by
leguminous plants. 35 The different species of bacteria existed independently in
nature and had been available separately in the market.36 The patentee's contribu-
tion had been to discover specific strains of each species that could be mixed to-
gether without inhibiting each other.37 The Court invalidated the patent because
the bacteria in the mixed culture "serve the ends nature originally provided and
act quite independently of arty effort of the patentee.38
By analogizing naturally-occurring DNA sequences to the bacteria in Funk
Brothers, one could argue that the gene fragments discovered by Dr. Venter are
phenomenon of nature and therefore nonpatentable. However, one could also
analogize "isolated" DNA sequences to purified pharmaceutical products which
the courts have found to be patentable. In cases regarding the patentability of
these pharmaceutical products, the courts have distinguished between patentable
subject matter and nonpatentable products of nature primarily by focusing their
inquiry on whether the claimed invention is the result of human intervention.39
Many pharmaceutical products occur in nature in an impure form, which
renders them unsuitable for public use. If a patentee isolates and purifies these
products to the extent that they are now available for public use, the courts tend
to allow patents for these "products of nature."40 The first of these patents was is-
3' 35 U.S.C. §101 (1988).
32 See generally STEPHEN A. BENT ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
WORLDWIDE (1987) (providing statutes from various foreign nations).
33 Only 2-3% of the total DNA sequences in the human genome code for genes. Leslie Roberts, Gambling on a
/ortcut to Genome Sequencing. 252 SCIENCE 1618 (1991).
333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
35 Id at 128.
36 Id at 129.
37 Id. at 128.
38 Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
39 See infra text accompanying notes 40-47.
40 See, e.g., In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (pure prostaglandins isolated from nature
patentable as new product); In re Kratz, 592 F.2d 1169 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (pure form of strawberry flavor
patentable). "[P]ure materials necessarily differ from less pure or inpure materials ... [hence] 'pure' materials
are 'new' with respect to them." Id. at 1173 (quoting In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1979)).
[Vol. 26: 3-4
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sued to Parke-Davis for purified adrenalin.41 Previously adrenalin had been avail-
able for use only as a component of powdered adrenal gland tissue.42 Because the
purified adrenalin was free of potentially harmful contaminants, the court held
that "it became for every practical purpose a new thing commercially and thera-
peutically.43 Similarly, the inventors in Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical
Corp.44 obtained a patent on purified vitamin B1 2. Although Vitamin B 12 occurs
naturally in cattle livers and certain microorganisms, the court upheld the validity
of the patent because the purified product was superior to the vitamin B 12 avail-
able from cattle because of its abundant supply, cheap price, and superior effi-
ciency.45 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that "the step from
complete uselessness to great and perfected utility is a long one"46 and that "noth-
ing in the language of the [Patent] Act precludes issuance upon a product of na-
ture when it is a 'new and useful composition of matter." 47
In Diamond v. Chakrabart, the Supreme Court agreed that § 101 should be
given a broad construction. 48 The issue in Chakrabarty was whether a living or-
ganism is patentable subject matter.49 On the basis of the language used in § 101
and the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act, the Court found that Congress
intended patentable subject matter to include "anything under that sun that is
made by man."50 Thus, even living organisms could be patented,5' as long as man
had intervened to make them "different" and to give them "the potential for
significant utility." 52 The Court also declared that Congress could amend the
statute if it wanted to exclude such inventions from patent protection." 3
41 Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 190 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) modified 196 F. 496 (2d Cit.
1912).
42 Id. at 103.
43 Id. (emphasis added).
44 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958).
45 id at 161.
46 id at 164.
47 Id. at 161.
48 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
49 Id. The examiner had rejected the applicant's claim to a bacterium into which the applicant had inserted a
foreign gene. Id. at 306.
50 Id. at 309.
51 When foreign genes are inserted into the germ cells, i.e. eggs or sperm, of a different species of animal, that
animal will pass on the newly-integrated gene to its progeny. Animals that have been permanently altered in this
way are called transgenic. BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 268-269 (2d ed.
1989).
The first patent for a genetically-engineered animal was granted to Philip Leder for the transgenic mouse
known as the "Harvard Mouse." In December, 1992, three additional patents were granted for transgenic mice.
The first went to Philip Leder for a mouse strain that naturally develops an enlarged prostate gland. The second
went to researchers at Ohio University for a mouse strain that contains a human gene for beta interferon, a
protein that fights viral infections. The third patent was granted to GenPharm, a biotechnology company based
in California, for a mouse with a deficient immune system. Edmund L. Andrew, U.S. Resumes Granting Patents
on Genetically Altered Mice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1993, at Al. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits the
atenting of genetically-engineered human beings. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.2 Chakrabarv. 447 U.S. at 310. The genetically-engineered bacterium claimed by the patentee had acquired
the ability to degrade several components of crude oil and had the potential to be useful for cleaning oil spills.
Id. at 305.
53 Id. at 318.
Winter/Spring 19931
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By focusing on the efforts of inventors to isolate DNA sequences with new
technological pharmaceutical uses, the courts have found that purified genes are
also patentable subject matter. Thus, in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical
Co., the district court upheld the validity of claims of U.S. Patent 4,703,008 to
purified and isolated DNA sequences of erythropoietin (EPO). 54 The court did
not agree with the defendant that the claimed invention was the DNA sequence
encoding EPO and therefore a "nonpatentable natural phenomenon." 55 Rather, the
court construed the claim as limited to the "purified" and "isolated" sequence. 6
Since the decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the PTO has granted patents
on various isolated and purified human genes. 57 Similarly, in the present case, the
PTO did not reject the NIH application under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the claims
pertained to nonpatentable subject matter. 58 Rather the application was rejected
due to lack of utility.
Statutory Requirement §101: Utility
The PTO rejected NIH's application under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the
claims purportedly lacked patentable utility. 59 Because few people go to the
trouble and expense of applying for a patent on a useless product, the PTO sel-
dom denies patent protection on this basis.6° This is especially true for mechani-
cal and engineering patents.61
The PTO cannot refuse a patent on a product having only one use.62 In ad-
dition, patent protection for a product is not limited to the use described in the
patent, but will encompass any future use that may be found for that product. 63
However, because the usefulness must be definite and known at the time the ap-
plication is filed and not contingent upon further research,64 the utility require-
ment presents a greater problem for inventors of chemical or biotechnological
34 13 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1737, 1759 (D. Mass. 1989), aff'd in part, revd in part, and vacated in part, 927
F.2d 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied. 112 S.Ct. 169 (1991). Erythropoietin is a protein that stimulates the
nthesis of red blood cells by the body. Antgen, 13 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1750.
Id at 1759.
56 Id
57 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,370,417 (claiming DNA sequence for plasminogen activator protein); U.S.
Patent No. 4,713,332 (claiming DNA sequence for human T cell antigen receptor); U.S. Patent No. 5,164,369
(claiming DNA sequence for human alveolar lung surfactant); U.S. Patent No. 5,166,058 (claiming DNA
sequence for human osteoinductive proteins); U.S. Patent No. 5,171,680 (claiming DNA sequence for human
sueroxide dismutase).5 See Office Report, supra note 15, at 210.
59 See id
60 See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 905.
61 Jeffrey L. Ilmen, Patenting Biotechnology: A Practical Approach, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J.
407,412 (1985).
62 Reid G. Adler, Genome Research: Fulfilling the Public's Expectations for Knowledge and
mmercialization, 257 SCIENCE 908,911 (1992).
In64 In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 945 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
[Vol. 26: 3-4
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products who often cannot predict the biological effectiveness of a product with-
out extensive research. 65 Thus, in Brenner v. Manson, the Supreme Court invali-
dated a patent for a new process for making steroids because the patentee had not
shown any utility for the steroids synthesized by the process.66 Explaining that a
patent is not a "hunting license," the Court found that the patentee's claim that the
compound could be useful some day was insufficient to satisfy the utility re-
quirement.67 Reasoning that Congress was unwilling to grant a monopoly to an
inventor unless the public received a benefit from the invention, the Court found
that a patent is "not a reward for search but compensation for a successful con-
clusion. 68 Thus, a product that is solely an object for "use-testing" 69 should not be
granted a patent.
When NIH filed its present application, it had no idea of the biological
function of the numerous genes it is seeking to patent. 70 This is because
biotechnology has not reached the stage where one can predict the function of a
protein encoded by a gene on the basis of sequence information alone. 71 Since the
applicant in Brenner was not able to patent a new steroid without an identifiable
use, 72 theoretically NIH should not be able to patent a DNA sequence without
identifying its use. In fact, many patent lawyers predicted that the NIH
application would fail for lack of utility. 73
Anticipating this objection, NIH identified several different general uses for
the sequences, including use as genetic markers for tissue typing or forensic
identification. 74 In its application, NIH also stated that the partial sequences could
be used to probe for complete genes that are actively being transcribed in brain. 75
Even though this represents a greater showing of utility than that made by the
patent applicant in Brenner,76 the PTO rejected several claims of the NIH patent
because they lacked substantial utility. 77 The examiner agreed that the sequences
0- See Kerin Kelly, Biotecluolgov Patent Protection Act. 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 263, 273 n. 44 (1990) for
a discussion of the special problems biotechnolgoy has with the utility requirement.
66 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
67 Id. at 536.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 535.
70 See Roberts, supra note 6, at 184.
71 Lorance L. Greenlee, Biotechnology Patent Law: Perspective of the First Seventeen Years, Prospective of
on the Next Seventeen Years, 68 DENV. U. L. REV., 127, 135 (1991). The function of a protein is determined by
its three-dimensional or tertiary structure.
1 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. at 535.
73 See Ginsberg, supra note 4, at 1. A number of attorneys also predicted that the application would not pass
the requirement of nonobviousness.
74 Venter Application at 6 (November, 1990) (A redacted copy of the 1990 Application was provided by the
Industrial Biotechnology Association, 1625 K Street, N.W., Suite 1100, Washington, D.C. 20006-1604).
75 1d at 34.
76 See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 905.
77 See Office Report, supra note 15, at 210.
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could be hybridized to a variety of different preparations of other nuclein acids.78
However, the examiner noted that one of skill in the art would not understand the
significance of any result of such a hybridization because the application did not
provide a basis for interpreting these putative results.79 Because it would be nec-
essary to do further work in order to establish substantial utility for the sequences
disclosed in the application, the PTO rejected the application under § 101.80
Statutory Requirement §102: Novelty
The requirements for novelty are set forth in §102 of the Patent Act.8 ' In
essence, the novelty requirement means that an invention is patentable only if it
was not previously produced or described. 82 The underlying rationale for this re-
quirement is that an inventor should not be permitted to monopolize something
that already exists in the public domain. 83 However, under § 102, a patent cannot
be denied or invalidated unless each and every element of the claim invention is
disclosed in a single prior art reference.s4 If every element is found in a single
prior art disclosure, the invention is anticipated.85 Usually, a patent-applicant for
a biotechnology invention can avoid problems with anticipation if he diligently
defines the differences between the invention and the prior art. 86
Even though a first inventor8 7 has publicly disclosed his invention prior to
filing an application, he may obtain a patent in the United States as long as the
application is filed within one year of the date of disclosure.88 This one year
grace period is unique to the United States and a few foreign countries.8 9 In most
18 See First Office Action, at 7. (1992) (A copy of the first Office Action was obtained from the Biotechnology
division of American Intellectual Property Lawyers's Association, 2001 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 203,
Arlington, VA 22202.)
79 See, id. at 6.
80 See, Office Report, supra note 15, at 210.
81 35 U.S.C. §102 (1988).
82 Specifically, the pertinent parts of §102 state:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for the
patent in the United States....
Id.
83 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
84 American Seating Co. v. National Seating Co., 586 F.2d 611, 618 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied. 411 U.S. 907
W1979).
59 Diversitech Corp. v. Century Steps, Inc. 850 F.2d 675, 677 (Fed. Cir. 1988).86 Hormone Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1096, 1101 (1988), affd in part and
vacated in part, 904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1434 (1991).
87 35 U.S.C. §102 (g) (1988).
88 35 U.S.C. §102 (b) (1988).
89 See Ihnen, supra note 61, at 411 n. 28.
[Vol. 26: 3-4
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foreign countries a disclosure prior to filing a patent application will bar
obtaining a patent. 90
In the present case, the PTO found that several claims of the NIH applica-
tion were so broad, vague and indefinite that they embraced the "cDNA li-
braries"91 which the inventors purchased from the biotechnology company
Stratagene for use in their experiments.2 Accordingly, the PTO rejected these
claims as being anticipated under §102(b) in that the claimed invention was
known or used by others in this country before NIH's invention.93
Statutor, Requirement §103: Non-obviousness
Prior to 1850, the only requirements for obtaining a patent were novelty and
utility.94 In 1850, the Supreme Court added a new hurdle to patentability in
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.95 The patentee in Hotchkiss had applied an old method
for making wood cabinet knobs to the making of clay knobs.96 Finding that the
process lacked "that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential ele-
ments of every invention," the Court invalidated the patent.97 This vague concept
of inventiveness was applied inconsistently in the cases that followed.98 In an at-
tempt to clarify this judicially-created test, Congress added the § 103 requirement
for non-obviousness to patent law in 1952.99 This statutory requirement is as fol-
lows:
A patent may not be obtained if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains. 00
9U Because NIH did not want to lose its foreign patent rights, it filed its application shortly before Venter
published the results of his experiments and added the sequences to the GenBank. See Ginsberg, supra note 4,
at 2.
91 To prepare the cDNA library it sold to Venter, Stratagene first isolated mRNA from brain tissue. The
genetic information encoded in each isolated mRNA molecule was then copied into a complementary DNA
(cDNA) replica. For a description of the process, see WATSON, supra note 5, at 610.
Because mRNA molecules are transcribed from active genes only, the library or collection of cDNA's
produced by Stratagene theoretically contains all the genes that are switched on in brain at a particular time
prior to isolation of the mRNA molecules. See Roberts, supra note 33, at 1618.
92 See Patent Rejection, at 13.
93 See Office Report, supra note 15, at 210.
94 See Merges, supra note 12, at 812.
95 52 U.S. (I 1 How.) 248 (1850).
96 Id. at 248.
97 Id. at 267.
98 See Merges, supra note 12, at 813.
99 Giles Rich, The Vague Concept of Obviousness as Replaced by Section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, in
NONOBVIOUSNESS - THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY §1:401. (John F. Witherspoon ed.,
1980).100 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
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Non-obviousness has been called the ultimate condition of patentability 1°'
because this requirement determines whether a new and useful invention is a
significant enough advance in the art to merit a patent. 0 2 The underlying
rationale for this additional requirement is to prevent issuance of a patent which,
in effect, removes existent knowledge from the public domain. 10 3
In Graham v. Deere, the Supreme Court formulated a three-part test that
judges and patent examiners employ to determine whether an invention meets the
non-obviousness requirement.' °4 First, the judge or patent examiner must deter-
mine the scope and content of the relevant teachings that existed at the time of
invention. 05 Second, he must determine the differences between the prior art and
the claims of the new inventions.'°6Third, he must assess the ordinary skill of
one engaged in the pertinent art.'0 7 Even though obviousness is assessed on the
basis of one having ordinary skill, this hypothetical "ordinary"artisan is familiar
with all the relevant prior art.' 0 8 Thus, if one of ordinary skill has all the
teachings of the relevant references before him and is able to produce the item
defined by the claims, the invention is obvious and non-patentable. 1°9 However,
the examiner or court is not to use hindsight in finding the claimed invention
obvious."1 The Supreme Court indicated that secondary considerations, such as
commercial success, long felt need for the invention and failure of others to
discover it, can serve as objective evidence of non-obviousness. Recently, the
Federal Circuit Court indicated that the examiner or court must consider such
evidence if it is available."'
101 The papers presented at a symposium commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversay of enactment of 35
U.S.C. §103 are compiled in NONOBVIOUSNESS - THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F.
Witherspoon ed., 1980).
102 See Merges, supra note 12, at 812.
103 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,6 (1966).
104 Id. at 17.
105 ld. at 17. The "scope of prior art" refers to any references that are reasonably pertinent to the particular
problem that the invention addresses and may include publications, common knowledge in the pertinent field,
and prior patents. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
106 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
107 Id. The court or examiner may consider several factors in determining the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art including 1) the education level of the inventor; 2) the type of problems encountered in the art; 3)
prior solutions to those problems; 4) the rapidity with which innovations are made; 5) the sophistication of the
technology; and 6) the education level of persons in the art. Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713
F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
108 Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
109 Id.
110 W. L. Gore & Assocs. V. Garlock, Inc. 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied. 469 U.S. 851
(1984). In Gore, the district court erroneously combined the individual, naked parts of separate prior art
references to recreate Dr. Gore's invention even though these references never suggested that such an invention
could be made and, in fact, taught against making the inventions. Id. As a result, the Federal Circuit Court found
that the lower court had flien "victim to an insidious effect of a hindsight syndrome wherein that which only the
inventor taught is used against its teacher." Id.
111 Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 947 (1987); Stratoflex, Inc. V. Aeroquip Corp. 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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There are three cases in which the Federal Circuit has provided insight into
the proper test for obviousness regarding biotechnology patents.' 12 In Hybritech,
Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed a lower court
decision invalidating the plaintiffs claims on the basis of obviousness.113 U.S.
patent 4,376,110 granted to the plaintiff was a process patent for a "sandwich as-
say"'1 4 using monoclonal antibodies" 5 to detect corresponding antigens in fluid
samples. 16 The prior art taught the use of polyclonal antibodies in similar
"sandwich assays" and ways to prepare monocloned antibodies were well
known.1 17 The Federal Circuit found that the prior art merely invited one to try
monoclonal antibodies in immunoassays and did not "suggest how that end might
be accomplished."'"18 The court also referred to the commercial success of the
plaintiffs assays and the unexpected advantage of these assays over previous
procedures using polyclonal antibodies as secondary considerations that bolstered
the finding of non-obviousness. "19
In the subsequent case of In re O'Farrell, the Federal Circuit upheld the ex-
aminer's rejection of patent claims for a recombinant DNA method 20 of
producing proteins in bacteria on the grounds of obviousness. 121 The cited prior
art included a journal article co-authored by two of the three co-inventors and
published more than one year earlier. 122 The major difference between the cited
reference and the new claims was substitution of a protein-encoding gene for the
frog ribosomal RNA gene that had been inserted into the expression vector in the
112 In terms of patent law, biotechnology usually refers either to recombinant DNA techniques and related
processes and products or production of monoclonal antibodies and related materials and methods. See Kate H.
Murashige, Section 102/103 Issues in Biotechnology Patent Prosecution, 16 AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW.
ASS'N. Q.J. 294 (1988-89)
113 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
114 In a sandwich assay, the antigen which is present in a fluid sample is first bound to a radioactively labeled
monoclonal antibody and then to an unlabeled second monoclonal antibody which is bound to a solid carrier.
After the solid carrier is separated from the fluid sample, the amount of radiolabeled material bound through the
sandwich (radiolabeled antibody-antigen-unlabeled antibody) to the carrier is determined. This enables the
investigator to calculate the amount of antigen present in the fluid. Hybritech. 802 F.2d at 1371.
115 Antibodies are the essential elements of the body's immune system and are used to detect and quantify
various antigens. Monoclonal antibodies are produced by a clone of cells from a single antibody secreting B
lyiihocyte. See, ALBERTS, supra note 51, at 177.
'A 6d802 F.2d at 1370.
117 Id at 1374.
118 Id. at 1380.
119 Id. at 1382-1384.
120 Recombinant DNA techniques include sequencing and synthesizing a specific gene that encodes for a
particular protein, inserting this gene into a special plasmid called an expression vector, and then introducing
the vector into a bacterium, yeast, or mammalian cell where the inserted gene directs the synthesis of its
encoded protein. See ALBERTS, supra note 51, at 193.
Stanley N. Cohen and Herbert W. Boyer were the first to report that a gene could be cut from the genome of
a donor organism, recombined in vitro with DNA of a host organism, and re-introduced into cells of the host,
thereby conferring the gene's characteristic function to the host. See Cohen & Boyer, Construction of
Biologically Functional Bacterial Plasmids in Vitro, 70 PROC. NArL ACAD. SCI. 3240 (1973).
Cohen & Boyer received the following patents for the "biologically functional molecular chimeras": U.S.
Patent No. 4,237,224; U.S. Patent No. 4,468,464; and U.S. Patent No. 4,740,470.
121 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
122 Id. at 899.
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published experiments. 12 3 Although the reference had suggested that the method
might be used to make proteins, the patent applicants argued that uncertainty in
the field of recombinant technology made this substitution merely "obvious to
try" and not obvious for the purpose of § 103.124 The court declared that
obviousness does not require "absolute predictability of success" but only a
"reasonable expectation" thereof.1 25
Furthermore, the court explained that inventions that are "obvious to try"
could be patentable if there were other mitigating factors, including: 1) no rea-
sonable expectation of success; 2) a requirement for undue experimentation
which involved varying all parameters until one could arrive at a successful re-
sult, where the prior art gave no indication of which parameters were critical; or
3) the work was an exploration of a new technology that "seemed to be a promis-
ing field of experimentation, where the prior art gave only general guidance as
how to achieve the claimed invention."' 26 Since these indicators of non-obvious-
ness were not present in the O'Farrell application, the court affirmed the examin-
er's rejection. '2 7
In Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., the Federal Circuit up-
held the validity under 35 U.S.C. §103 of Amgen's product claim to a purified
gene for erythropoietin. 28 Because the prior art did not suggest that the probing
strategy used by Amgen to isolate the gene would be likely to succeed, the court
agreed that the claimed gene itself was non-obvious.19 Under this analysis, an in-
ventor may be able to satisfy the non-obviousness requirement for patenting a
previously unavailable DNA sequence by showing that the techniques he used to
obtain the gene are themselves new and non-obvious. 30 This analysis conflicts
with the long-established principle that one cannot obtain a patent on an old
product simply by developing a non-obvious way of obtaining that product.'
31
However, it is consistent with other cases in which patents on products that were
obviously desirable, but unobtainable by then-existing methods have been grated
to inventors who developed non-obvious means of making these products.
32
'2. Id at 900-901.
124 Id at 902.
125 Id. at 903-904.
126 Id at 902-903.
127 In fact, the court found that the cited reference provided evidence that the substitution taught by the
claimed invention had a reasonable chance of success. Id. at 904.
128 927 F. 2d 1200 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied. 112 S.Ct. 169 (1991).
129 Id. at 1208.
130 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patenting the Hunan Genome. 39 EMORY L. 1. 721, 736 (1990).
131 Buono v. Yankee Maid Dress Corp., 77 F. 2d 274, 279 (2d. Cir. 1935).
132 See, e.g. In re Irani, 427 F. 2d 806 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (reversing rejection of patent on crystalline ATMP on
ground that it would not have been obvious how to make such a product under the prior art); Shaw v. E.B. &
A.C. Whiting Co., 417 F. 2d 1097 (2d. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1076 (1970) (upholding validity of
product patent on artificial filaments with cruciform shape and linear orientation of molecules on ground that it
was not obvious in the prior art how to make such a product.)
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In the present case, the PTO rejected several of NIH's claims under §103.13
The patent examiner found two prior art references that taught the use of DNA
fragments as probes for identifying genes.' 34 In addition, the examiner found a
published DNA sequence that contained a segment corresponding to one of those
disclosed by NIH. 35 The examiner noted that these references could be combined
to make NIH's invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. 136
Enabling Disclosure: §112.
The quid pro quo for obtaining a patent is an adequate disclosure of the
claimed invention. 37 The rules regarding adequacy of disclosure in a patent
specification are found in the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). 138 These
rules ensure that an inventor had possession of the claimed invention on the filing
date of the application. 39 They also ensure that the specification provides a
sufficient teaching so that one of skill in the pertinent art can make and use the
claimed invention.140 This is referred to as the enablement requirement. ' 4'
In In re Fisher, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) stated
that "the scope of the claim[ed invention] must bear a reasonable correlation to
the scope of enablement provided by the specification.' ' 42 Because biotech-
nology inventions are often claimed broadly, the enablement requirement poses
special problems for biotechnology patent applications. 4 3 This is well-illustrated
in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical, Co., '44 where the plaintiff not only
tried to claim the forms of human recombinant erythropoeitin that it had made,
1 -- See Office Report, supra note 15, at 210.
134 Patent Rejection, at 14-20.
135 Id. at 15-20.
136 See Office Report, supra note 15 at 210.
137 Flick Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-line Mfg. Co. 351 F. 2d 546, 551 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958
1966).
38 The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §112 (1988) reads as follows:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
The second paragraph is directed to the claims. The claims define the legal boundaries of the patented invention.
In re Anderson, 471 F. 2d 1237, 1241 (C.C.P.A. 1973). If the claims are ambiguous, the court will interpret
them in light of the specification. Aktiebolaget Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstad v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 705 F. 2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1983).139 In re Herschler, 591 F. 2d 694, 700 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
140 In re Moore, 439 F. 2d 1232, 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
141 Id.
142 427 F. 2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
143 See Edward T. Lentz, Adequacy of Disclosures of Bioteclnology Inventions, 16 AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW
ASS'N. QJ. 315, 316 (1988-89).
144 927 F. 2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.CL 169 (1991).
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but also all analogs 45 that could be made in the future. The court noted that the
gene encoding EPO contained about 4000 nucleotide bases 146 and that Amgen
had only disclosed how to make EPO and a few analogs. 47 Applying the rule of
Fisher, the Federal Circuit found that Amgen's specification was insufficient to
support a claim to all possible analogs of EPO and upheld the lower court's
conclusion that the generic DNA sequence claims were invalid under § 112.148
The specification need not teach and preferably omits what is already well
known in the art. 149 However, it still must provide sufficient detail to enable the
skilled artisan to practice the invention without undue experimentation.'1° Some
experimentation is acceptable as long as it is not undue. 151 In In re Forman, the
Board of Patent Appeals set forth the following factors for determining what
constitutes undue experimentation: 1) the quantity of experimentation necessary;
2) the amount of direction or guidance presented in the application; 3) the pres-
ence or absence of working examples; 4) the nature of the invention; 5) the state
of the prior art; 6) the relative skill of those in the art; 7) the predictability or un-
predictability of the art; and 8) the breadth of the claims.' - 2 Since these factors
are illustrative and not mandatory, it is not necessary for the examiner or court to
use all of them in determining whether a specification fulfills the requirements of
§ 112.
In the present matter, NIH initially claimed not only the 315 partial gene
fragments sequenced by Dr. Venter, but also the whole genes encompassing the
fragments, 53 the proteins encoded by those genes, 54 and antibodies to these pro-
teins. '5 5 In its continuing application of July, 1992, NIH dropped the claims to the
proteins and antibodies but retained the claims to the full genes. 56 The NIH pro-
posal provides a general description of how to use these fragments to find the
full-length gene and how to achieve expression of the gene once it is found, 5 7
but the disclosure is not detailed. 58 The examiner noted that NIH admitted the
145 An analog of EPO is a protein that exhibits one or more of the biological properties of EPO despite some
substitutions in the amino acid sequence of the molecule. id. at 1212.146 Since 3 nucleotide bases in a DNA sequence encode one amino acid, the protein encoded by this sequence
should contain approximately 1330 amino acid. See ALBERTS, supra note 51, at 102. The district court had
found that over 3,600 analogs could be made by substitution at only a single amino acid position on this protein.
An ten 927 F. 2d at 1212.
14Id. at 1213.
148 Id. at 1214.
149 Hybritech, Inc. v. Monodonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F. 2d 1367, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied. 480
U.S. 947 (1987).
150 In re Moore, 439 F. 2d 1232, 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
151 In re Wands, 858 F. 2d 731 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
152 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546 (P.T.O. Bd. Pat. Appl. & Inter. 1986).
153 Venter Application, Claims 6, 7 & 8.
154 Venter Application, Claim 13.
155 Venter Application, Claim 14.
156 See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 904.
157 Venter Application, at 3-4.
158 See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 905.
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possibility of errors in the sequence data. Thus, the disclosure could not be relied
upon by one of skill in the art to produce the claimed invention. 159 In addition,
the examiner found that several of the claims required some knowledge about the
coding regions of the DNA's and that the application gave no information
regarding these regions.t6° Because the specification offered no guidance as how
to isolate or identify all of the sequences claimed, undue experimentation would
be required to produce these sequences and their products. 161 Thus, the examiner
objected to the specification under 35 U.S.C. §112 for failing to provide an
enabling disclosure.162
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN SUPPORT
OF NIH'S PATENT APPLICATION
Considering the numerous objections of the PTO to NIH's application 163 and
predictions that the application would fail,164 one might wonder why NIH sought
patent protection at this early stage of its research on the human genome. NIH
reasons that such patents are necessary 1) to promote use of this knowledge for
subsequent development of products to diagnose and treat genetic diseases165and
2) to protect the U.S. biotechnology effort.1 66 NIH's decision is consistent with
government policy toward patenting of government-funded research.
t 67 It also
recognizes the problems that the biotechnology industry has with current patent
law doctrines.
Government Policy Regarding Federally-Funded Research: Technology Transfer
Dr. Venter's federally-funded research at the NIH was part of the Human
Genome Project, an international effort begun in 1986 to sequence, identify and
map all of the human genes. 68 The decision of the United States Government to
159 First Office Action, supra note 78, at 8.
160 id
161 Id at 9-10.
162 See Office Report, supra note 15, at 210.
163 See supra text accompanying notes 77-80, 91-93, 134-137, and 160-162.
164 The former top legal official at the Department of Health and Human Services says that he argued against
NIH filing the application. Leslie Roberts, Top HHS Lawyer Seeks to Block NIH, 258 SCIENCE 209, 209-10
J192).
5 See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 904. The term for this is innovation.
166 See Roberts, supra note 6, at 255.
167 A significant change in the attitude toward patenting government-funded research began in the 1980's.
Prior to that time, granting exclusive rights to invention arising from publicly-funded research was considered
inappropriate. See Kiley, supra note 14, at 915. Examples of the change include: the 1980 Patent and Trademark
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-29 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§200-211 (1988))
(allowing universities to retain patent rights on inventions arising from government funded research at these
institutions and allowing large businesses to receive exclusive licenses for use of such inventions); and the 1986
Technology Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 99-502 (1986) (encouraging government laboratories to patent and
license their invention and to enter into joint ventures with private concerns).
168 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, MAPPING OUR GENES - THE GENOME
PROJECTS: HOW BIG, HOW FAST? (1988) [hereinafter Mapping Our Genes] The objectives of the genome
project are: 1) to establish databases containing information about DNA sequences, location of DNA markers
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join in this project was based upon recommendations which it received from the
National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences and the con-
gressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA).169 The OTA, especially, was
concerned that the large federal investment in the project be translated into new
products and services beneficial to U.S. citizens. 170 To promote commercial de-
velopment of genome research, the OTA recommended that project investigators
seek patents on their discoveries.171 The patentee then could grant an exclusive li-
cense to a private investor to induce him to develop the invention into a product
that is useful to the public. 172 This is referred to as technology transfer. 73
Proponents of technology transfer contend that this process leads not only to new
projects but also to new jobs.174
The OTA also expressed its concern that a U.S. inventor could lose control
of a federally-funded invention if he did not file a patent for it and a foreign in-
ventor who independently made the same discovery did. A possible consequence
of this would be that the foreign patentee would not give manufacturing prefer-
ence to U.S. firms.' 7 5 In addition, the U.S. inventor would be prevented from use
of the invention.176 Thus, OTA recommended that investigators on the genome
project, such as Dr. Venter, seek patents on their inventions.177
Current statutory law designed to promote technology transfer provides
another compelling reason for NIH's action. Under 15 U.S.C. §3713, a federal
agency that refrains from patenting or otherwise promoting commercialization of
an employee's invention must allow the employee to retain title to the inven-
tion.178 Had NIH not sought a patent for his work, Dr. Venter might have been
able to obtain the patent for himself. The result would be that a single private 79
individual would have patent rights to an invention that had been funded at con-
siderable expense by U.S. taxpayers.
and genes, function of identified genes, and other related information; 2) to create maps of human chromosomes
that would permit scientists to locate genes quickly; 3) to create repositories of research materials; 4) to develop
new instruments for analyzing DNA; 5) to develop similar resources for other organisms that would facilitate
biomedical research and 6) to determine the DNA sequence of a large fraction of the human genome and that of
other organisms. Id. at 7.
169 Victor A. McKusick, Mapping and Sequencing the Human Genome. 320 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 910 (1989).
170 Estimated costs for the 15-year project are $3 billion. Jacqueline Courteau, Genome Databases, 254
SCIENCE 11 (1992).
171 See Mapping Our Genes. supra note 168, at 168.
172 See Kiley, supra note 14, at 915.
173 See Mapping Our Genes, supra note 168, at 165.
174 See Kiley, supra note 14, at 915.
175 See Mapping Our Genes, supra note 168, at 168.
176 Id
177 Id.
178 15 U.S.C. §3710(d) (1988). Normally, a government employee assigns all patent rights to inventions made
in the course of his employment to the governent. This statute allows him to regain those rights if the
ovemnment does not pursue the patent.
79 Dr. Venter has left NIH to head a new non-profit biotechnology institute. Robin Herman, NIH Genes
Researcher is Leaving For His Own Lab, WASH. POST, July 7, 1992, at Z4.
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Need for Patent Protection for Biotechnology.
Analysts project that U.S. sales of biotechnology-derived products 180 will
reach $40 billion by the year 2000 and that world-wide sales will reach $100 bil-
lion. 18' As expected, international competition in this potentially-lucrative indus-
try is increasing. 82 Currently, U.S. biotechnology companies appear to be ahead
of their foreign competition in most respects, but this might not always be the
case. 183 Many commentators have suggested that patent rights are crucial for this
U.S. industry, especially while it is in its infancy. 184 Because the initial invest-
ments and the risks involved in new product development in biotechnology are
quite high, 85 these commentators argue that under-investment will occur unless
this industry is given added protection through patenting., 86 In addition, U.S.
companies may face stiff foreign competition from imported products based on
U.S. inventions unless these inventions are given patent protection.1 7 These types
of arguments may have provided some of the impetus for NIH's decision to file
its patent application on Dr. Venter's discoveries.
Uncertainty in Patenting Biotechnology Products and Processes
The Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabartv,, which held that a
living, man-made microorganism is patentable, opened up the floodgates on
patent applications for biotechnology products and processes. 88 However, uncer-
tainty regarding the patentability of these biotechnology inventions is great be-
cause the techniques are new and complex and because there is comparatively
little case law interpreting the criteria for granting these patents. 89 Consequently,
most of the PTO's decisions have been based on case law regarding chemical or
pharmaceutical inventions. However, such inventions may not analogize well to
biotechnology discoveries. '90
180 Biotechnology products include DNA sequences, recombinant DNA, monoclonal and polyclonal
antibodies, peptides, pharmaceuticals, vaccines, enzymes, cell lines, diagnostic kits, processes for synthesizing
or obtaining these materials, diagnostic processes, treatment processes and related instrumentation. See Ihnen,
supra note 61, at 407.
David T. Kingsbury, The Regulator. "Coordinated Framework" for Biotechnology, 4 BIOTECH. 1021,
I1g72 (19 86).
182 David Beier & Robert H. Benson, Biotechnology PatentProtection Act, 68 DEN. U. L. REV. 173, 174
1991).
83 See id.
184 For a description of biotechnology as an industry which is relatively new, small, and exceptionally
sensitive to any perturbation in its economic environment, see Burk, supra note 27, at 16-21.
185 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U.
CHICAGO L. REV. 1017,1026 (1989).
186 See Burk, supra note 27, at 22-23.
187 U.S. laws prohibit importation for sale of a patented product manufactured in a foreign country unless the
?atentee has given the foreign company a license to make the product. 35 U.S.C. §271 (a) (1988).
88 See lhnen, supra note 61, at 407.
189 See Mapping Our Genes, supra note 168, at 167.
190 See Adler, supra note 62, at 909. For a discussion of how In re Durden, 763 F. 2d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985), a
chemical case, has been misapplied to biotechnology-derived process claims, see Beier & Benson, supra note
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Three patent doctrinal requirements have presented unique problems to the
patentability of biotechnology inventions: utility, 19' obviousness, and enable-
ment.192 Of these, obviousness has proven to be the most troublesome.193 One
commentator has noted that the 1986 Hybritech decision' 94 and the 1988 decision
in O'Farrell'95 regarding obviousness of biotechnology inventions focus on dif-
ferent considerations and, therefore, do not provide a clear standard for determin-
ing obviousness. 96 Another unusual basis for finding non-obviousness is put
forth in Amgen, in which the claim for a DNA sequence for a human gene was
found non-obvious because the procedures used to isolate the gene were non-ob-
vious.197 This appears to confuse the patentability of the product with the non-
obviousness of the process used to obtain it.
Although Amgen lowers the non-obviousness hurdle somewhat, a patent
examiner could still reject many biotechnology patent applications because the
processes for making new biotechnology products tend to be well-known and
their use widespread. 198 The rapid transition that occurred in the patentability of
monoclonal antibodies provides a good example of this. In Ex Parte Old, the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board) reversed the examiner's rejec-
tion under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims to monoclonal antibodies for cell surface
antigens of human renal cancer because the technology used was an empirical art
in which the results were unpredictable. 199 Thus, the results were unexpected and
non-obvious. 200 One year later, in Ex Parte Erlich, the Board affirmed rejection
under 35 U.S.c.§103 of claims to monoclonal antibodies for fibroblast inter-
feron.20' It found that once the antigen is selected, the use of the antigen in the
known method would allow one to approach this project with a reasonable
expectation of success. 202 Although the steps required to obtain this product were
"tedious and laborious," the Board found they were routine in the field and, there-
fore, did not render the product non-obvious. 20 3 Because of the rapid advances in
182 at 176-181. For a discussion of how previous decisions regarding product-by-process claims have a
negative impact on biotechnology patent applications see Burk, supra note 27, at 34-40.
1 See Kelly, supra note 65, at 273.
192 See supra text accompanying notes 136-141.
193 For a discussion of how the utility requirement impacts on biotechnology, see Kelly, supra note 65, at 277-
281.
194 See supra text accompanying notes 113-119.
195 See supra text accompanying notes 121-127.
196 The invention in Hybritech was obvious to try, and none of the mitigating factors enumerated in O'Farrell
were present in Hybritech. Nevertheless, the invention in Hybritech was found nonobvious. Hybritech, Inc. v.
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987). This
suggests that the Federal Circuit used different criteria in deciding the two cases. See Murashige, supra note
112, at 297.
197 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct169 (1991).
198 See Kelly, supra note 65, at 280.
199 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196, 199-200 (P.T.O. Bd. App. & Inter. 1985).
200 ld
201 3 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1011, 1015 (P.T.O. Bd. of App. & Inter. 1986).
202 ld,
203 Id at I016.
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biotechnology, the law regarding the patentability of DNA sequences is undergo-
ing a similar transition.204
In the instant case, NIH argues that as soon as it disclosed the partial se-
quences discovered by Venter, any subsequent products or remaining develop-
ment steps may have become obvious and therefore unpatentable. 205 NIH's ar-
guments is that a molecular biologist of ordinary skill would find sufficient di-
rection in the pertinent art available in 1992 to use these gene fragments to find
the complete genes and the to use the genes to produce valuable proteins via re-
combinant DNA technology. 2°6 In response to this claim of obviousness, subse-
quent inventors could use the criteria of O'Farrel°-0 7 to argue that their inventions
remained non-obvious because NIH did not provide any information as to the
function of these complete genes and, therefore, offered no incentive or direction
for searching for a particular gene or protein.208
NIH's argument is weakened by the examiner's rejection under § 112 of its
specification due to the lack of an enabling disclosure.2°9 However, in view of the
uncertainty regarding non-obviousness of biotechnological inventions, the PTO's
rejection does not necessarily destroy NIH's argument. The specification could
well prove revealing enough to render any subsequent invention obvious even
though it does not provide enough detail to satisfy the enablement requirement.
210
In addition, other scientific advances which cure these enabling deficiencies
might occur in the near future. These advances in conjunction with NIH's
disclosure could preclude subsequent inventors who discover the useful genes
and products related to these sequences from obtaining a patent.21' In fact, many
commentators, including those who argue against issuance of a patent for this
application, agree that NIH's assessment of the problem for subsequent inventors
may be correct.212
OPPOSITION To NIH'S APPLICATION
NIH's patent application has generated an international debate among sci-
entists, legal experts, and government officials. 213 Those who disapprove of
2U4 See Adler, supra note 62, at 910.
205 See id. Rapid and widespread disclosure of new scientific discoveries is one of the tenants of basic research
institutes.
206 See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 907.
207 See supra text accompanying note 126 for a discussion on how obviousness is determined by the
qredictability and difficulty of the research needed to obtain these results.08 See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 907.
209 See Office Report, supra note 15, at 210 and supra text accompanying notes 160-163.
210 See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 907.
211 See id.
212 See id.
213 International scientists, legal experts, and government officials debated this issue at a public forum held
last May by the Genome Patent Group. Patents, Senate Subcommittee Hearing Focuses on Rejection of NIH
Gene Patent Requests, BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, September 24, 1992, at 186 [hereinafter
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NIH's action do so either because they think it will not accomplish NIH's goals or
because they find it unethical and against patent policy.
Practical Concerns
NIH argues that patent protection is necessary to promote investment for
developing new products based on its discoveries, i.e. innovation.21 4 Some critics
think NIH's argument is unfounded. 21 5 Currently, there is no clear proof that
property rights are necessary to foster investment in new product development. 216
Being the first to have a new product on the market may provide sufficient eco-
nomic benefit to promote investment in innovative research. 217 In addition, com-
panies could obtain their own process patents on a method for using the "obvi-
ous" genes even if NIH does not obtain a product patent for these molecules.
However, process patents for biotechnology are less common because most
biotechnology methods are routine.2t8 In addition, process patents can be difficult
to enforce if the final product gives no clue as to how it was made.219
Other critics argue that NIH's broad-scope product patent could actually
discourage innovation. 220 This is because anyone who uses the gene fragments or
complete genes during development without authority from NIH could be held
liable for infringement under 35 U.S.C. §25 l(a).221 Licensing would be one way
to mitigate the problem. However, licensing can still delay the discovery of use-
ful products if NIH were to grant exclusive licenses to a limited number of re-
searchers. 222 In contrast, if NIH were to grant multiple licenses to U.S. biotech-
nology companies, it could achieve both of its goals of encouraging innovation
and promoting the U.S. biotechnology industry.
Subconmrittee Hearing]. The Department of Energy (DOE) which provides 40% of the funding for the U.S.
Human Genome project disagreed with NIHs decision to file the application. See Roberts, supra note 6, at 184.214 Robin Herman, The Great Gene Gold Rush: U.S. Rankles Other Countries with Preemptive Strike in the
Race to Patent Human Genes. WASH. POST, June 16, 1992, at ZI 1.
215 Most members of the biotechnology industry have adopted the policy that patents for DNA sequences
should only be granted once the entire sequence and the function of these sequences are known. See POSITION
PAPER, supra note 2, at 1.
216 For a discussion of the economic theories to support this argument, see Eisenberg, supra note 185, at 1036-
1046.
217 See id. at 1026.
218 For a comprehensive discussion of the problem with obviousness in process patents, see Burk, supra note
27 at 42-57.
219 See Eisenberg, supra note 130, at 739.
220 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 C)LUM. L. REV.
839 (1990) explains how granting broad scope patents for inventions at the early stages of development in a
science-based technology discourages others from innovation, i.e. putting the existing invention to practical use
and thereby creating new products.
221 35 U.S.C. §271(a) (1988).
222 For an economic analysis showing that faster development is better, see Merges Nelson, supra note 220, at
878.
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However, even if NIH were to grant non-exclusive licenses to all U.S.
biotechnology companies, 223 issuance of this broad-scope product patent sets a
bad precedent. Other investigators are doing similar research,224 and at least one
private biotechnology company has filed a patent application for DNA sequences
of unknown function.2 25 However, NIH cannot control the licensing policies of
private investigators. Because the U.S. doesn't mandate licensing for private in-
ventors, 226 these investigators can choose not to grant licenses to subsequent in-
novators. Thus, private investigators could prevent development of valuable
products if they too were granted broad-scope patents.
In addition, most companies prefer to have their own patents on new inven-
tions and not exclusive or non-exclusive licenses. Therefore, if the PTO issued a
patent to NIH for the numerous genes it is claiming, many companies might be
tempted to abandon their current research efforts aimed at product development
and join the rush to sequence fragments.227 Since the average nucleotide sequence
disclosed by NIH contains only 300-500 bases228 and the average gene contains
thousands of bases, patent rights to different parts of a single gene could
conceivably be held by more than one "inventor. "229 Thus, companies involved in
developing biological products could find they would need multiple licenses to
continue their work. At some point, paying royalties to multiple patentees could
become economically unfeasible, and the companies would be forced to abandon
new product development.230
Other critics point out that NIH's potential patent fails to provide complete
protection to U.S. companies. The most effective protection against infringement
by foreign competitors is a patent for a final end product that is sold to con-
sumers. Such patents provide a right to exclude competitors from selling the
patented product regardless of how it is made or what it is used for.231 Patents on
starting materials for making an unpatented end product are less effective. This is
because such patents do not prevent a competitor from using the patented mate-
rial overseas to make the unpatented end product and then importing it into the
United States.232 Since genes are used primarily to produce marketable proteins
LLj The provisions for licensing by a government agency are found in 37 C.F.R. §404 (1992).
224 Amgen, a California biotech company has reported that it has also decoded a large number of genes with
undetermined functions. See Herman, supra note 214, at Z11.725 The company, Incyte Pharmaceuticals of Palo Alto, California is gearing up to sequence 100,000 sequences
mvear. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 301.
35 U.S.C. §271(d) (1988) permits licensing but doesn't require it. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas
o 448 U.S. 176, 176-77 (1980).
£
2 f See POSITION PAPER, supra note 2, at 4-5.
228 See Roberts, supra note 6, at 184.
229 See POSITION PAPER, supra note 2, at 4.
230 See Ginsberg, supra note 4, at 22.
231 Hide-Ite Leather Co. v. Fiber Prod. Co., 226 F. 34, 36 (1st Cir. 1915).
232 Amgen, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l. Tade Comm'n., 902 F 2d 1532, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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for treating genetic deficiencies, 233 patents issued to NIH for entire genes would
not prevent this practice. Even less protection would be provided if NIH is lim-
ited to protection for the gene fragments only. 234 This is because the gene frag-
ment would be used to obtain the gene, which is a step even earlier in the process
of obtaining a protein.235 In addition, because NIH could obtain patent rights to
these genes long before any patented products made from them are ready to be
sold, its licensees would not be able to enjoy protection for the full 17 year patent
period. 236
Policy Considerations
A number of scientists and lawyers consider the patenting of human genes,
the very essence of life, unethical. 237 These individuals contend that the human
genome is a collective property that should be held in common among all
humanity.238 Recognizing the necessity to protect intellectual property rights,
these scientists suggest that process patents be granted for the use of these
sequences rather than for the sequences themselves. 239 However, most parties to
the debate agree that genetic information can be claimed. 240 They object
primarily to NIH's attempt to claim property rights to complete genes without
knowing the entire sequence of these genes or their function.241 By so doing, NIH
is subverting the doctrinal requirements for a patent. 242
In Brenner v. Manson, the Supreme Court interpreted the utility require-
ment of § 101 to indicate that "a patent system must be related to the world of
commerce rather than to the realm of philosophy. , 243 This language suggests that
the function of the utility requirement is to distinguish between basic research,
which should stay in the public domain, and applied technology, which may be
patented. 244 Those who agree with this view find that the NIH disclosure of par-
"53 Other genes may serve as components of diagnostic kits. As such, they will be end products and obtain
complete protection. See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 906.
234 Steve Bent, a patent attorney, has predicted that the patent will be limited to the fragments. See Roberts,
su ra note 6, at 185.
2 For a description of the process, see Roberts, supra note 6, at 184.
236 35 U.S.C. §154 (1988).
237 Gina Kolata, Ideas & Trends; In Rush to Patent Genes, the Claims Get Smaller, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
1992, at 12.
2 3 8 See, e.g., David E. Kom, Patent and Trade Secret Protection in University-Industry Research
Relationships in Biotechnology, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191 (1987); Christine Gorman, The Race to Map Our
Genes, TIME, Feb. 8, 1993, at 57.
239 Dr. Victor McCusick, the founder of the international Human Genome Organization, is one of these
individuals. Last month scientists at a Human Genome conference in Brazil issued a Declaration of Patenting of
Human DNA Sequences which echoes Dr. McCusicks ideas. See Herman, supra note 214, at ZI 1.
240 100 or more patents have already been granted for sequences of complete genes. See id.
241 The patents for other gene sequences were granted in conjunction with a specific process or product for
which the gene was to be used. See, id.
242 See, e.g., Kiley, supra note 14, at 916; Victoria Slind-Flor, Patents Pending, NATL L. J., June 8, 1992, at
39.243 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966).
244 See Kiley, supra, note 14, at 916; Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 905.
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tial gene sequences is too far from the realm of commerce to be patentable.245 To
allow a patent to issue for the whole gene when NIH has only provided a mini-
mal utility for the partial sequences would defy the spirit of this requirement.
246
The enablement requirement ensures that patents are granted only to those
who have added to the "public storehouse of knowledge." 247 Since much of the
work done by the Venter group utilized an automated sequencer, many would
contend it is unworthy of this type of reward.248 The Industrial Biotechnology
Association, whose members collectively represent 80 percent of U.S. investment
in technology, has noted that the real work on the way from partial sequence to
final product will be done by others.249 This organization considers it unfair to
permit NIH to exercise complete control over a subsequent product when the
agency has contributed so little to the development of the product. 250 However,
patents are not necessarily granted to those who do a prodigious amount of
work.25 1 Nor are they limited only to those who have exhibited a flash of ge-
nius.252
Individuals involved with the international genome project have expressed
great concerns regarding NIH's action. They fear that patenting will hamper the
free dissemination of information necessary to realize the goals of this project.253
However, both patent law and scientific norms favor disclosure.25 4 It is much
more likely that a decision by other genome researchers to patent their discover-
ies will merely delay disclosure. These researchers might defer publication of
their results until they are certain that they have reached the point of patentability
of their invention. 255
Finally, those who oppose NIH's action predict that genome researchers will
abandon their current, unique approaches to the problem and join the mad
24D See. e.g., Kiley, supra, note 14, at 916.
246 See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 905.
247 In re Argoudelis, 434 F. 2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J. concurring).
248 Dr. James Watson, the former director of NIH's genome project and Nobel Prize winner for his work
elucidating the structure of DNA, was "horrified" that a patent could be granted to work that could be done by
"virtually any monkey." See Roberts, supra note 6, at 184. note 6 at 184.
249 IBA estimates that a typical biotechnology company invests more than three hundred person-years in
developing a new drug, while NIH has invested less than 20-person minutes in each sequence. See POSITION
PAPER, supra note 2, at 4.
250 See, id.
251 Gillman v. Stem, 114 F. 2d 28 (2d Cir. 1940), cert denied. 311 U.S. 718 (1940) (finding that the test of a
valuable discovery is the ingenuity needed for the new conception and not the amount of physical
readjustment).
252 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966).
253 Although Dr. Venter has submitted his sequences to the international data bank and has freely shared his
discoveries with other researchers, NIHs detractors point out that others might not be willing to do so. See
Roberts, supra note 6, at 186.
254 For a discussion of the conflicts and compatibility of science and patent law, see, Eisenberg, Proprietary
Ri*hts and Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987).2 See Eisenberg, supra note 130, at 741.
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scramble to sequence DNA fragments if the NIH patents issue. 256 At the very
least, they predict a disappearance of co-operation in this international effort.
257
SOLUTIONS
Preserving Patentability of Downstream Products
NIH filed its application on partial DNA fragments because it was con-
cerned that subsequent products related to these fragments, such as complete
DNA sequences and proteins, would be found unpatentable. 258 Several commen-
tators agree that NIH's interpretation of the current patent law may be correct.
259
To overcome this problem, they propose judicial or legislative remedies. 26°
Downstream inventions could be found unpatentable under §§101 & 102
because they are not "new". Once a researcher publishes information on the com-
position of matter it becomes part of the public domain. 26' In the U.S., the prod-
uct does not become new for patent purposes simply because someone finds a
new use for it.262 In In re Thuau, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals re-
jected patent claims to metacresolsulfonic acid-aldehyde condensation products
as treatments for diseased tissue because the same compound had earlier been
known for other purposes. 263 Thus, a patent examiner could reject the product
claim of a downstream researcher who identifies the biological activity of genes
encompassing the sequences published by NIH simply because NIH has shown
some minimal utility for these partial sequences. In contrast, European countries
allow claims to a substance as it is used for a new purpose even though the
underlying substance is old. 264 On the basis of Thuau, it is unlikely that U.S.
courts will expand the law in this direction.2 65 Therefore, legislative action would
be required to allow these downstream inventors the patent protection granted to
their European counterparts. 266 However, this would be an extreme change in
U.S. patent law and does not provide the best solution to the problem.
2-() There have also been warnings that such wholesale patenting could double the cost of obtaining the human
lenome sequence. See Roberts, supra note 6, at 184.
57 Antonio Ruberti, Letters, 256 SCIENCE 11 (1992).
258 See Ginsberg, supra note 4, at 2-3.
259 See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 907; Kiley, supra note 14, at 916. At the outset of the genome project the
Office of Technology Assessment concluded that the genome project would most likely not raise new issues of
3atent law. See Mapping Our Genes, supra note 168, at 16.
60 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 62, at 910-913.
261 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (1988) listing publications as prior art.
262 In re Thuau, 135 F. 2d 344 (C.C.P.A. 1943).
263 Id. at 346-47.
264 See Kiley, supra note 14, at 916.
265 1La
266 Id.
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At present, it is uncertain whether publication of sequence data would ren-
der downstream discoveries obvious. 267 Much depends on how quickly biotech-
nology advances, how the PTO construes the 1992 level of technological skill,
and how the PTO applies previous decisions of the Federal Circuit concerning
chemical patents to biotechnology applications. In In re Dillon, the Federal
Circuit sitting en banc held that similarities in structure between a new chemical
compound and prior art leads to a prima facie case of obviousness. The court
held that the discovery of unpredictable properties or functions were not to be
considered for determining non-obviousness. Since the genetic code allows one
to determine the sequence of amino acids in a protein from the sequences of
bases in the corresponding gene, an examiner could use Dillon to reject a protein
patent application under §103 if the DNA sequence has been disclosed. However,
in contrast to chemistry where structure predicts function, biotechnology has not
reached the point where the biological function of a protein can be predicted
from its primary structure, i.e. sequence of amino acids.268 Although this would
argue against using Dillon to reject biotechnology applications, 269 it is too early to
tell whether the PTO would accept this argument. To avoid problems of obvi-
ousness for inventions flowing from NIH's disclosure, Congress could amend the
patent law to declare that publication of partial sequences does not make these
subsequent inventions obvious.270
As an alternative to amending the patent system, Congress could create a
new system to provide proprietary rights in this data. 271 In the past, Congress has
created new intellectual property systems to protect novel plant varieties 272 and
semiconductor chip masks.273
Preventing Patenting of Partial DNA Sequences by Other Investigators
NIH has characterized the filing of is application as an interim policy,274
suggesting that it might decide not to pursue patent rights for partial DNA se-
quences. However, even if NIH abandons its application, current regulations of
If1 See Greenlee, supra note 71, at 132-133.
268 Tertiary structure, or the configuration a given sequence of amino acids acquires upon folding, controls the
functionality of a protein. At present, models of protein structure are not sufficiently developed to predict
tertiary structure on the basis of sequence information alone. See Greenlee, supra note 71, at 136 n. 48.
269 For a discussion on how Dillon impacts biotechnology, see, Margaret M. Wall & Justin Dituri, The En
Banc Rehearing of In re Dillon: Policy Considerations and Implications for Patent Prosecution, 68 DENV. U.
L. REV. 261 (1991).
270 Dr. Venter has proposed an amendment to §103 as follows. "Prior art shall not preclude patentability of an
amino acid or nucleotide sequence solely because such prior art discloses a portion of such sequence." See
Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 213, at 188.
71 See Adler, supra note 62, at 913.
272 The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§2321-2522 (1988)).
273 The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620,98 Stat 3347 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§901-914 (1988)).
274 See Ginsberg, supra note 4, at 19. NIH had to file before Venter published his results or forfeit its right to
obtain a foreign patent.
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the Department of Health and Human Services require that it allow employees
such as Dr. Venter to seek patents for themselves. 275 Two measures could fill this
loophole.27 6 The first suggested approach is a change in the federal law to ensure
that federal agencies can prohibit patents on inventions made by their employees
if the agency, after due process, determines such patents are not in the public
interest.277 The second is that NIH seek an advisory opinion from the Justice
Department to the effect that publication alone would constitute commer-
cialization under the Federal Technology Transfer Act.2 78 This would foreclose
NIH employees or extramural researchers funded by NIH from obtaining patent
rights under 15 U.S.C. §3710d for such inventions.
In the alternative, NIH could seek an international agreement that all gov-
emments and their research grantees involved in the human genome project will
not seek patents on DNA's of unknown biological activity. 279 Many foreign
countries have already indicated that they support this policy.280 However, such
an agreement would still allow those in the private sector to obtain patents having
no greater basis than that disclosed by NIH. To prevent this possibility, it might
be necessary to redefine utility and set a higher threshold for this requirement.2 81
Despite language in Brenner v. Manson that the utility must be "substantial", only
a minimal showing of utility has been required in many recent court decisions.2 P
In contrast, the British require an invention be capable of industrial
application.2 83 However, withholding patents on early research discoveries with a
minimal utility could prevent early disclosure and cause researchers to protect
their discoveries as trade secrets. 284 Consequently, this might not be the best
approach from a public policy standpoint.
2 1 See supra text accompanying notes 181-183.
276 Dr. Venter's remarks suggest that he is not interested in obtaining gene patents for himself. See. e.g.
Herman, supra note 179, at Z4; Subconmmittee Hearing, supra note 213, at 186. However, similar problems that
arise in the future could be prevented by taking the proposesd actions now.
277 See Kiley supra note 14, at 918.
278 See Position Paper, supra note 2, at 6.
279 See Kiley, supra note 14, at 917.
280 In response to NIIHs move, the United Kindgom also filed patent applications for gene fragments. The
French handed over their research results to UNESCO as a symboloic protest against the American and British
attempts to obtain these patents. Over 200 scientists from around the world also signed a declaration sent to
UNESCO calling for the results of the genome project to remain in the public domain. Declan Butler, Who
Owns the Building Blocks of Life?, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 2, 1992, at 14. At the same time the U.K.
government filed its application, it announced its intention to seek an international agreement disallowing
atents for gene sequences of unknown utility. Alan Howarth, Letters, 256 SCIENCE 11 (1992).
81 For an explanation as to how NIH could obtain judicial review of this issue in the Supreme Court and why
it might not be possible, see Kiley, supra note 14, at 917.
282 See, e.g., E.l. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., 620 F. 2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1980) (stating that a
commercially successful product is not required.); Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F. 2d 753 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (finding that an invention which has limited utility and is only operable in certain application should not
be rejected for lack of utility).283 See Kiley, supra note 14, at 917.
284 See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 905.
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Another proposed solution with broad implications is a moratorium on is-
suance of all patents for "human tissue, fluid, cell, gene, or gene sequences. 285
This would prevent researchers from obtaining patent rights on partial sequences
and allow time for debating the issues presented by such applications. However,
it also could destroy the U.S.'s lead in biotechnology. 286
Promoting Innovation
If the NIH patents were to issue, this agency could prevent others from us-
ing the fragments to find genes and from using the genes to produce proteins. To
prevent a limited number of individuals from having complete control over sub-
sequent research utilizing these fragments and/or genes, commentators have sug-
gested that NIH grant non-exclusive licenses to all-comers or dedicate them to
the public. 287 Again, this solution would have no impact on a private sector re-
searcher who obtains similar broad-scope patents.
To prevent such private sector patentees from impeding subsequent re-
search, some commentators have suggested a legislative experimental use excep-
tion to 35 U.S.C. §271(a), which gives the patent-holder the power to enjoin an
infringer.288 Although an exception for experimental use has been implied to this
statute, the Federal Circuit held the exception to be "truly narrow" in its most
recent ruling on this issue.289Thus, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to suffer
monetary damages before the defendant is found liable.290 In addition, an
'innocent' infringer can be held liable.291 Because the exception is not applicable
unless the use is for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity or for strictly philosoph-
ical inquiry," 292 it is of no value to commercial corporations, whose charters
normally do not authorize such activities.293 Because the lines between academic
research and commercial research are blurred in the area of biotechnology, the
defense may not be available to researchers at non-profit institutions. 294 Although
283 The moratorium was proposed by Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Ore) in an amendment to the NIH
Reauthorization Act of 1991. See Slind-flor, supra note 242, at 39.
286 The moratorium was opposed by Dr. Sullivan, the secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services under President George Bush. See id
287 See Ginsberg, supra note 4, at 22.
288 35 U.S.C. §271(a) (1988) reads as follows: Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent
289 Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. 733 F. 2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856(1984).
290 /d at 861.
291 Aro. Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 491 (1964).
292 Roche, 733 F. 2d at 863.
293 Irving N. Feit, Biotechnology Research and the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 171 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 819, 832 (1989).
294 See Eisenberg, supra note 185, at 1017-18 which discusses the overlap between basic and applied research.
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non-profit organizations are rarely sued for infringement,295 it has happened on
occasion.296
An expanded experimental use defense is especially important when the
claimed invention is a basic research tool, 297 as it is in the present case. Free ac-
cess to these early discoveries is necessary for optimum development of new and
improved products. 298 However, an overly-broad exception could reduce the
strength of patents to the point where they do not provide an incentive to in-
vent. 299 Thus, the exception must be appropriately drafted to satisfy the compet-
ing objections of the patent system: incentive to invent and benefit to the pub-
lic. 300 Two sets of recommendations have been proposed for a new statutory
experimental use exception. 30' Both recognize that a researcher and potential
competitor should not be enjoined from using a patented basic research tool if
that use results in the improvement of the tool or development of a new product.
Rather, such use should require payment of a reasonable royalty to the initial in-
ventor if the product becomes commercially profitable. This type of exception
provides certainty for the competitor and thus encourages investment in biotech-
nological research. 302 It also allows both the initial inventor and the innovator to
reap appropriate rewards from their contributions and benefits the public by pro-
duction of new and useful products. 30 3
Since the number of competing products and processes that will infringe
upon a patent is directly proportional to its scope, another means of protecting
subsequent innovators from liability for infringement is to limit the scope of
these patents. 304 Critics of broad-scope product patents at the early stages of
product development contend that awarding limited patents is also more consis-
tent with the enablement doctrine of § 112.305 In the present case, limiting patent
protection to the fragments only could reduce the number of cases of literal in-
fringement.
As one commentator suggested, the blocking power of these product patents
can be limited further if the courts apply the Doctrine of Reverse Equivalents to
295 See Feit, supra note 293, at 822. Possible explanations for failure of patentees to sue non-profit research
institutions include: lack of knowledge about the infringement and a realization that research efforts by non-
profit organizations which improve or provide a new use for the product may make the original product more
valuable commercially. See, Eisenberg, supra note 130, at 741.
296 See Tenneco v. Vector Magnetics, Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q. 2d. (BNA) 1591 (N.D.N.Y. 1988), where Cornell
University was a co-defendent.
297 See Feit, supra note 293, at 819.
298 For a duscussion of the importance of free access see Eisenberg, supra note 185, at 1046-1066.
299 See id., at 1033-34.
300 See Feit, supra note 293, at 839-840.
301 See id., at 840 Eisenberg, supra note 185, at 1078.
302 See Feit, supra note 293, at 840-41.
303 Id. Surprisingly, members of the biotechnology industry have indicated they see no need for such an
sxeption. See Adler, supra note 220, at 839.
See Merges & Nelson, supra note 220, at 839.305 Id. at 915.
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accused infringers who use the encompassing genes in recombinant protein pro-
duction. 30 6 This defense is allowed to the accused infringer when his product is
"so far changed in principle" from the claimed product that it "performs in a sub-
stantially different way and is not therefore an appropriation." 30 7 The Federal
Circuit has stated that the purpose behind the doctrine is to "prevent unwarranted
extension of the claims beyond a fair scope of the patentee's invention. ' 30 8 When
applying the doctrine, the court is to weigh the accused devise against the
equitable scope of the claims, which in turn is determined in light of the specifi-
cation, the prosecution history3°9 and the prior art.3 10 Since the NIH application
discloses a use of the gene fragment for obtaining a complete gene and provides
only general instructions for subsequent development, this commentator contends
that use of the implicated gene to direct synthesis of a protein can be excused
under the doctrine because the use falls outside the equitable scope of the
claimed invention. 31'
Because the doctrine is applied only in cases of literal infringement, the ac-
cused infringer's improvement must be significant to qualify for this immunity.
312
If courts were to excuse literal infringement often, the faith of inventors in the
patent system would diminish. Since some courts may not find recombinant
protein production a significant improvement over NIH's claimed invention, they
may not be willing to apply a doctrine which conceivably has a negative impact
on the patent system. In fact, successful use of the doctrine is fairly rare.
313
CONCLUSION
Some individuals consider patenting human genes unethical. Nonetheless,
the courts have upheld product patents issued to researchers who have deter-
mined the complete sequence and biological function of the claimed gene. 314
Recently, NIH filed an application claiming patent rights to thousands of human
genes even though it had sequenced only a segment of the genes and had no idea
of their biological functions.31 5 NIH has given several reasons for its unusual
actions. First, the agency contends that patent protection for these genes is neces-
3-0 See Greenfield, supra note 21, at 1095.
307 SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 775 F. 2d 1107, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc).
308 Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F. 2d. 1565, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
309 The prosecution history found in the records of the patent office can be used like legislative history to
assist in the construction of the claims that survive in the issued patent. See 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS
§ 18.05 (1992). If a patentee agrees to certain limitations of the claims as required by the patent office, he cannot
Tie for infringement of the unlimited invention. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1966).1 0 Scripps, 927 F.2d. at 1581 (emphasis added).
311 See Greenfield, supra note 21, at 1082.
312 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 220, at 867 n. 120.
313 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1278, 1350, (D. Del. 1987) (noting that
reverse equivalents is rarely successfully aserted), affd, 865 F. 2d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
314 See Herman, supra note 214, at Zl l.
315 See Leary, supra note 7, at B26. It is expected to take the PTO a year to issue its final ruling on NIH's
application. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 302.
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sary to encourage development of related biomedical products. 16 This is consis-
tent with federal policy regarding technology transfer of government-funded re-
search.3" 7 Considering the opposition from the biotechnology industry to is-
suance of these patents and the lack of economic data supporting this policy,
NIH's first premise is at best debatable.
NIH also contends that publication of the partial sequences could preclude
subsequent researchers who develop related products from obtaining patent pro-
tection for their inventions. 318 A number of legal experts who consider this
prediction possible have suggested alternative solutions to this potential problem.
The problem could be avoided if Congress were to declare that disclosure of
partial gene sequences does not render subsequent related discoveries obvious.3 19
Because this proposed change is so specific, it would have less impact on the
whole of patent law than other proposed solutions. In addition, there is precedent
which would allow Congress to narrowly-tailor an exception.3 20 However, this
narrow exception might not solve all the patent problems for potential innovators.
Conversely, NIH's prediction of problems for downstream inventors may simply
be incorrect.
NIH's application has uncovered problems with 15 U.S.C. §3713, which al-
lows federal employees to retain title to their inventions if the government re-
frains from patenting or otherwise promoting commercialization of the invention.
Under this statute, it is uncertain whether government employees can be pre-
vented from seeking patents on inventions that should be left in the public do-
main. Recommendations for dealing with this problem include amending the
statute or seeking a ruling from the Attorney General which declares that
publication constitutes commercialization for purposes of the statute. 321
NIH's application has also focused attention on other unresolved areas of
patent law. For example, the threshold for meeting the utility requirement may be
too low to preclude private inventors from obtaining patent protection prema-
turely. The utility requirement could be strengthened by the judiciary or the legis-
lature. However, it this hurdle is set too high, basic researchers might be tempted
to withhold their data until they are certain their products are patentable.
31( See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 904.
317 See supra text accompanying notes 169-175.
318 See Roberts, supra note 6, at 185.
319 See supra note 270.
320 In response to Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), Congress adopted the Patent
Law Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(0
(1988)). In brief §271(f) upholds infringement liability for anyone who supplies components of a patented
invention to a manufacturer for assembly in a foreign country. Id.
321 See POSITION PAPER, supra note 2, at 6.
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Before policy makers alter the law to preclude patenting of basic research,
they should consider other consequences. In the past, basic research at non-profit
institutions was funded almost exclusively by the government. However, because
the national debt is so high, scientists can no longer presume that sufficient gov-
ernment funding for all basic research will continue in the future.322 The patent
system provides an alternative for funding scientific research. It if were no longer
available to basic researchers, the growth of scientific knowledge could be re-
tarded.
Other solutions have been proposed to minimize the negative legal impact
of patenting basic research tools on subsequent innovators. These include limit-
ing the scope of the patents3 23 or expanding the experimental use exception. 324
Such solutions provide viable alternatives to the problem and are less likely to
produce adverse consequences for basic research than strengthening the utility
requirement.
Although the judiciary could clarify some of these issues, it is not capable
of resolving all of them. In addition, judicial review is time-consuming and is not
easily directed at a particular problem. Because some of these problems may re-
quire a policy change, Congress is the most appropriate governmental body to
remedy the situation. 325 Hopefully, after considered debate, it will change patent
law in a manner which protects the biotechnology industry without undermining
the Constitutional policies that form the basis for the patent system.
PAMELA A. DOCHERTY*
311 See Eliot Marshal & David P. Hamilton, R & D Budget Collides with the Deficit. 258 SCIENCE 208 (1992)
for a report on federal budget cuts for basic research.
323 See generally Merges & Nelson, supra note 220.
324 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 186, Feit, supra note 293.
325 At the request of Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass) the Office of Technology Assessment launched a
study on the propriety of gene patents and their impact on research. If Congress decides to enact legislation on
the issue, it should have the results of the study by April, 1994. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 302.
* J.D. candidate May 1994, second-year student, University of Akron School of Law; PH.D., Physiology, The
Pennsylvania State University, 1979.
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